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both the intensities and the perceptions of the problems differ from one 
country to another, so that intercountry comparative analyses of recent 
historical developments are necessary. Through these analyses we attempt 
to identify the underlying processes of economic structural change and 
formulate useful hypotheses concerning future developments. The under- 
standing of these processes and future prospects provides the focus for 
ILASA's project on Comparative Analysis of Economic Structure and Growth. 
Our research concentrates primarily on the enipirical analysis of 
interregional and intertenporal economic structural change, on the sources 
of and constraints on economic growth, on problems of adaptation to sudden 
changes, and especially on problems arising from changing patterns of 
international trade, resource availability, and technology. In this 
paper R. Ballance considers fundamental changes in one of the most long- 
standing industries in the last two decades and emphasizes the need for 
a systematic evaluation of an industrial performance. 
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SHRINKING DEMAND IN AN AGEING INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF STEEL 
Robert Ballance 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Because the demand for steel is a derived one which depends on conditions 
in steel-using industries, one appealing means of examining the industry's 
recent history is in terms of its links with these industries. Alternative 
approaches, for example those which highlight the technological dimensions of 
the industry's evolution, the impact of national policies related to the steel 
industry or other features, may be equally appropriate. In fact, the 
industry's difficulties are so complex and varied as to require analysis from 
a variety of viewpoints. Many of the salient problems are, neverkheless, 
'demand-related' and readily lend themselves to a discussion couched in these 
terms. 
Following a prolonged period of sustained growth and expansion, the 
industry's prospects changed drastically during the 1970s. The first section 
of this paper looks at some of the factors -- both domestic and foreign -- 
which have contributed to this transition by altering steel's relationships 
with its user industries. Among the domestic factors, fundamental changes in 
the composition of economic activity have diminished the industry's relative 
importance in many developed economies. The consequences of these 
macro-economic shifts have been compounded by industry-specific trends which 
have permanently reduced the dependence of steel-using industries such as 
automobiles, machine tools, shipbuilding or construction. The new 
vulnerability of many integrated steel producers can also be traced to 
international considerations. Relative changes in the global configuration of 
the steel industry have altered producers' links with foreign markets and 
their relationships with foreign competitors. Although the steel industry in 
all established centres of production has experienced considerable adjustment 
pressure, the nature of global shifts in production and trade have accentuated 
plight of the American and West European industries. 
The second section looks at the change in domestic conditions in more 
detail. Statistical evidence documenting the fall in demand for steel 
products in major markets is examined. Major producers regarded the signs of 
decelerating demand as being merely a temporary aberration. Steel firms 
m a i n t a i n e d  a  g e n e r a l l y  complacent a t t i t u d e  towards t h e i r  buyers  and c l u n g  t o  
an  inves tment  s t r a t e g y  which,  i n  t h e  longer  r u n ,  accep ted  e x c e s s  c a p a c i t y  a s  
n e c e s s a r y  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  market  s h a r e  i n  t imes  of maximum demand. A 
second ,  b u t  e q u a l l y  impor tan t  development which is  emphasized i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  
i s  t h e  r a p i d  emergence of  s m a l l ,  non- in tegra ted  min i -mi l l s .  These new 
p r o d u c e r s  have c a p t u r e d  a s  much a s  one f i f t h  of  some domes t i c  marke t s  and 
t h e i r  s h a r e  can be expec ted  t o  i n c r e a s e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n  t h e  n e x t  decade.  The 
s u c c e s s  of min i -mi l l s  i s  p a r t l y  e x p l a i n e d  by t h e  c o s t  advan tages  they  e n j o y  
r e l a t i v e  t o  i n t e g r a t e d  p roducers .  However, t h e y  have a l s o  developed much 
c l o s e r  l i n k s  wi th  t h e i r  buyers  and t h i s ,  t o o ,  h a s  been a n  impor tan t  r e a s o n  f o r  
t h e i r  p r o g r e s s .  
The t h i r d  s e c t i o n  looks  a t  some o f  t h e  f o r c e s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  a  growing 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of  s t e e l  markets .  With t h e  p o s s i b l e  e x c e p t i o n  of  J a p a n ,  
s t e e l  had t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been a  'home-bound' i n d u s t r y .  However, f o l l o w i n g  t h e  
slump i n  world demand f o r  s t e e l ,  many i n t e g r a t e d  p roducers  were f o r c e d  t o  t u r n  
t o  f o r e i g n  markets  i n  o r d e r  t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h e  problem of mounting e x c e s s  
c a p a c i t y .  Other  f a c t o r s ,  n o t a b l y  t h e  growing v a r i e t y  of s t e e l  p r o d u c t s  
demanded by u s e r s  and a  g r a d u a l  d e c l i n e  i n  t r a n s p o r t  c o s t s ,  a l s o  c o n t r i b u t e d  
t o  t h e  h e i g h t e n e d  i n t e r e s t  i n  e x p o r t s .  S t e e l  e x p o r t s ,  bo th  d i r e c t  and 
- 
i n d i r e c t  ( i . e . ,  t r a d e  i n  s t e e l - u s i n g  p r o d u c t s  such a s  c a r s ,  t o o l s ,  o r  
mach ine ry) ,  r o s e .  One consequence was t h a t  s t e e l  p roducers  were f u r t h e r  
d i s t a n c e d  from t h e i r  buyers .  And many o f  t h e  l a r g e r  i n t e g r a t e d  f i r m s  were 
slow t o  a d j u s t  t o  t h e  new requ i rements  expec ted  of  s e l l e r s  i n  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t s .  
A major r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  shor tcoming i s  t h a t  t h e  s t e e l  i n d u s t r y  i s  n o t  y e t  an  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  one i n  t h e  same s e n s e  a s  many o t h e r  mature  i n d u s t r i e s  a r e .  
Major s t e e l  f i r m s  a r e  conspicuous  by t h e i r  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  p r o d u c t i o n  
s i t e s  i n  f o r e i g n  marke t s .  As s t e e l - u s i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  such a s  au tomobi les  and 
s h i p b u i l d i n g  r e l o c a t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  1970s ,  t h e i r  s t e e l  c o n t r a c t s  moved w i t h  
them. S t e e l  f i rms  have on ly  r e c e n t l y  begun t o  respond t o  t h i s  d a n g e r ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  home-market o r i e n t a t i o n  coupled w i t h  t h e i r  
f i n a n c i a l  problems and v a s t  s i z e ,  c o n t i n u e  t o  make t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  a  genu ine  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n d u s t r y  a  d i f f i c u l t  one.  
1.1 Domestic L inks  wi th  User I n d u s t r i e s  
The s t e e l  i n d u s t r y ' s  domest ic  l i n k s  wi th  o t h e r  f i e l d s  of  i n d u s t r y  can  be  
s k e t c h e d  from two d i f f e r e n t ,  b u t  complementary, v i e w p o i n t s .  At t h e  
economy-wide l e v e l ,  t o d a y ' s  major growth a r e a s  a r e  q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  from t h o s e  
which were prominent p r i o r  t o  1960. They i n c l u d e  t e l e c o m u n i c a t i o n s ,  e n e r g y ,  
a e r o s p a c e  and computers.  Unl ike  t h e  l e a d i n g  i n d u s t r i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  two 
t h i r d s  o f  t h i s  c e n t u r y ,  t h e s e  new f i e l d s  a r e  n o t  i n t e n s i v e  u s e r s  of  s t e e l .  I n  
most developed c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  demand f o r  s t e e l  i s  dependent on a  s e t  o f  u s e r  
i n d u s t r i e s  which,  themse lves ,  a r e  l o s i n g  ground r e l a t i v e  t o  o v e r a l l  economic 
a c t i v i t y .  There  a r e  o t h e r  s t r u c t u r a l  changes t h a t  a r e  e q u a l l y  broad i n  scope  
and have ,had  s i m i l a r  consequences .  Because t h e  s e r v i c e  s e c t o r ' s  s h a r e  i n  GDP 
i n  developed c o u n t r i e s  h a s  tended t o  grow r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  
m a t e r i a l  goods,  inves tment  h a s  g iven  way t o  consumption i n  t h e  e x p e n d i t u r e  o f  
n a t i o n a l  income. Both s e r v i c e s  and consumption a r e  l e s s  s t e e l - i n t e n s i v e  t h a n  
inves tment  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of m a t e r i a l  goods. Thus, t h e  r e l a t i v e  d e c l i n e  i n  
t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  s h a r e  i n  domes t i c  o u t p u t  and employment i n  many developed 
c o u n t r i e s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  c o n t i n u e .  
These  macro-economic s h i f t s  have  been  r e - e n f o r c e d  by i n d u s t r y - s p e c i f i c  
deve lopmen t s .  F i r s t ,  t e c h n i c a l  advances  h a v e  r e d u c e d  t h e  s t e e l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
of  v a r i o u s  i n d u s t r i e s .  West German f i g u r e s  showing s t e e l  i n p u t s  p e r  1000 kg .  
o f  f i n i s h e d  p r o d u c t  s u g g e s t  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e s e  advances  f o r  s t e e l  
p r o d u c e r s .  Dur ing  t h e  1970s ,  German s t e e l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  
e l e c t r i c a l  machinery  d e c l i n e d  by 10 p e r  c e n t  and by 9  p e r  c e n t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
r o l l i n g  s t o c k .  The d r o p  was even more a b r u p t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  s h i p b u i l d i n g  
where s t e e l  u s a g e  f e l l  by 23 p e r  c e n t ,  w h i l e  f o r  n u t s ,  b o l t s ,  and s i m i l a r  
p r o d u c t s  s t e e l  i n p u t s  were  r e d u c e d  by 11 p e r  c e n t .  11 Second,  t h e  emergence  
o f  new p r o d u c t i o n  t e c h n i q u e s ,  combined w i t h  c h a n g i n g  p a t t e r n s  o f  f i n a l  demand, 
h a s t e n e d  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  aluminium, p l a s t i c s ,  and h i g h l y  r e s i s t a n t  g l a s s  
f o r  s t e e l  i n  many t r a d i t i o n a l  u s e s .  The s u b s t i t u t i o n  p r o c e s s  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
r a p i d  i n  t h e  a u t o m o b i l e  i n d u s t r y .  A f t e r  1975,  t h e  amount o f  s t e e l  p e r  a u t o  
d e c l i n e d  s i g n i f i c a n t  ly.2/ F o r  s t e e l  p r o d u c e r s  i n  Nor th  America and Wes te rn  
Europe ,  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  c r e a t e d  by s u b s t i t u t i o n  were  compounded by r i s i n g  
a u t o  i m p o r t s  o r  by d o w n s i z i n g  of  domes t i c  models .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  US t h e s e  
two i n i t i a t i v e s ,  a l o n e ,  a r e  e s t i m a t e d  t o  have  c u t  t h e  s t e e l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  
t h e  American a u t o m o b i l e  i n d u s t r y  by 8-10 m i l l i o n  s h o r t  t o n s  p e r  annum i n  
r e c e n t  y e a r s  -- e q u i v a l e n t  t o  10 p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  US s t e e l  marke t  .2/ 
While t h e  impe tus  f o r  t h e s e  t r e n d s  may d i f f e r ,  t h e i r  consequences  c a n  a l l  
be  d e p i c t e d  i n  t e rms  o f  s t e e l ' s  l i n k s  w i t h  i t s  u s e r  i n d u s t r i e s .  The 
economy-wide t y p e s  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  changes  d e s c r i b e d  above  would n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
d i m i n i s h  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  of  t h e  s t e e l  i n d u s t r y ' s  r o l e  a s  a  m a j o r  s u p p l i e r  t o  
o t h e r  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  o r  t o  o t h e r  s e c t o r s  such  a s  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .  However. such  fundamen ta l  s h i f t s  i n  economic s t r u c t u r e  w i l l  
mean t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  impor t ance  o f  s t e e l  w i t h i n  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c t o r  o f  
deve loped  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  s u r e l y  c o n t i n u e  t o  d e c l i n e .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  
t y p e s  of  i n d u s t r y - s p e c i f i c  t r e n d s  d e s c r i b e d  h a v e  a  more d i r e c t  impact  on t h e  
i n d u s t r y ' s  economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  i t s  u s e r s .  The new a b i l i t y  t o  
economize on s t e e l  i n p u t s  and t h e  i n r o a d s  made by a l t e r n a t i v e  m a t e r i a l s  w i l l  
permanen t ly  a l t e r  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  i n t e r - i n d u s t r y  l i nkages&/  which 
p r o v i d e d  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  s t e e l ' s  s t e a d y  e x p a n s i o n  t h r o u g h o u t  most  o f  t h i s  
c e n t u r y .  
By t h e  l a t e  1970s  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  of  t h e s e  f o r c e s  had u n m i s t a k e a b l y  
d i m i n i s h e d  t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  p r o s p e c t s .  T h e r e  had  been  a  d e f i n i t e  d e p a r t u r e  f rom 
t h e  long- term growth  t r e n d  t h a t  c o u l d  n o t  be  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  c y c l i c a l  f a c t o r s  o r  
t o  t h e  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  impact  o f  r i s i n g  e n e r g y  p r i c e s .  I n  J a p a n ,  f i g u r e s  f o r  
t h e  l a t e s t  f i s c a l  y e a r  (1983)  show t h a t  o n l y  two of  t h e  f i v e  l a r g e s t  s t e e l  
p r o d u c e r s ,  Nippon S t e e l  and Kawasaki S t e e l ,  were  p r o f i t a b l e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  j u s t  
t h r e e  of  t h e  s i x  l a r g e s t  American f i r m s  r e p o r t e d  p r o f i t s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  
of  1984 and much of  t h i s  was from n o n - s t e e l  a c t i v i t i e s .  Recen t  pe r fo rmance  i n  
o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  was e q u a l l y  d i s m a l .  The two ma jo r  F rench  f i r m s ,  S a c i l o r  and 
U s i n o r ,  l o s t  $1.8 b i l l i o n  i n  1983 w h i l e  B r i t i s h  S t e e l  C o r p o r a t i o n  r e p o r t e d  a  
l o s s  o f  $191 mi l l i on . ? /  E x p l a n a t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  b r u t a l  r e v e r s a l  i n  t h e  
i n d u s t r y ' s  pe r fo rmance  a r e  v a r i e d  and e x t e n d  beyond t h e  t y p e s  of  d o m e s t i c  
f a c t o r s  d e s c r i b e d  above .  The p l i g h t  o f  some p a r t s  of  t h e  i n d u s t r y  was g r e a t l y  
c o m p l i c a t e d  by d r a s t i c  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  wor ld  p r o d u c t i o n  and t r a d e  
which a r e  examined be low.  
1.2 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Complicat ions  
S t a r t i n g  around 1870 t h e  s t e e l  i n d u s t r y  i n  most of t o d a y ' s  r i c h  c o u n t r i e s  
embarked on a  f u l l  c e n t u r y  of growth and e x p a n s i o n ,  s p u r r e d  by t h e  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  of v a s t  s h i p p i n g  f l e e t s ,  r a i l w a y  sys tems and machines .  I n  f a c t ,  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  a  s t e e l  i n d u s t r y  was g e n e r a l l y  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  
s u c c e s s f u l  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .  The widespread importance  g iven  t o  t h e  
development of a  n a t i o n a l  s t e e l  i n d u s t r y ,  coup led  w i t h  expanding domes t i c  
demand, l e d  t o  a  g r a d u a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  number of s t e e l - p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  
T h i s  s t e a d y  upward t r e n d  was marred by o c c a s i o n a l  c y c l i c a l  f l u c t u a t i o n s ,  f o u r  
of  which occur red  i n  t h e  high-growth p e r i o d  between 1946 and 1970.61 A s  t h e  
i n d u s t r y  con t inued  t o  expand, changes i n  t h e  world  s t e e l  h i e r a r c h y  were 
o c c u r r i n g .  The UK was t h e  w o r l d ' s  predominant s t e e l  producer  p r i o r  t o  1900 
when i t  was r e p l a c e d  by t h e  US. American l e a d e r s h i p  reached  a  z e n i t h  around 
1920 when i t  accounted f o r  60 pe r  c e n t  of world  p r o d u c t i o n .  S i n c e  t h e n ,  t h e  
US s h a r e  has  s t e a d i l y  f a l l e n ,  amounting t o  l e s s  t h a n  12 per  c e n t  by t h e  e a r l y  
1980s .  But u n t i l  t h e  1970s buoyant demand meant t h a t  most major  s t e e l  
p roducers  were n o t  plagued by c o n t r a c t i v e  problems a r i s i n g  from e x c e s s  
c a p a c i t y ,  t h e  t h r e a t  of s u b s t i t u t e s  o r  d e c l i n i n g  p r o f i t s .  
Tab le  1 documents t h e  changing map of world s t e e l  p r o d u c t i o n  s i n c e  1950. 
Two s i g n i f i c a n t  f e a t u r e s  can be no ted .  F i r s t ,  t h e  s h a r e s  of world  p r o d u c t i o n  
i n  Japan ,  E a s t e r n  Europe and o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  (main ly  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s )  
have a l l  r i s e n .  Toge the r ,  t h e  t h r e e  groups  o f  c o u n t r i e s  accoun ted  f o r  a lmos t  
66 p e r  c e n t  of world s t e e l  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  1982. These  g a i n s  o c c u r r e d  a t  t h e  
expense  of p roducers  i n  North America and t h e  EEC. I n  t h e  former  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r a c t i o n  was an a b r u p t  one a l t h o u g h ,  f o r  European s t e e l m a k e r s ,  
i t  h a s  been more g r a d u a l .  A second impor tan t  f e a t u r e  concerns  t h e  growth of  
world s t e e l  p roduc t ion .  The l e v e l  of  world o u t p u t  f e l l  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n  
1975. A f t e r  resuming i t s  upward t r e n d ,  o u t p u t  d e c l i n e d  a g a i n  i n  1980 and 
con t inued  i t s  downward s l i d e  i n  l a t e r  y e a r s .  Both f a c t s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  
c o n t r a c t i v e  p r e s s u r e  on s t e e l  p roducers  i n  North America and t h e  EEC h a s  been 
con t inuous  and i n t e n s e  s i n c e  t h e  e a r l y  1970s.  Latecomers l i k e  t h e  USSR and 
Japan  a r e  now t h e  premier  s t e e l  producing n a t i o n s .  I n  1983,  t h e s e  two 
c o u n t r i e s  accounted f o r  23 and 14.7 pe r  c e n t  of  t h e  w o r l d ' s  c r u d e  s t e e l  
p r o d u c t i o n  r e s p e c t i v e l y  .l/ 
But t h e  problems f o r  p roducers  i n  mature  s t e e l  markets  were n o t  s imply t h e  
r e s u l t  of a  re-a l ignment  i n  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t i v e  c a p a c i t i e s .  T h e i r  p o s i t i o n  a s  
l e a d i n g  e x p o r t e r s  of s t e e l  was a l s o  eroded.  T a b l e  2  shows d a t a  on world s t e e l  
e x p o r t s  which c l o s e l y  p a r a l l e l s  t r e n d s  i n  world  p r o d u c t i o n .  I n  t h e  t h r e e  
decades  s i n c e  1950 t h e  North American s t e e l  i n d u s t r y  h a s  been reduced  t o  a  
minor e x p o r t e r  w h i l e  t h e  EEC h a s  s e e n  i t s  s h a r e  f a l l  by more t h a n  one t h i r d .  
Again,  t h e  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  was mainly a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  e x p o r t  g a i n s  i n  J a p a n ,  
deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s  and s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s .  
T h i s  b r i e f  overview i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  
w o r l d ' s  s t e e l  i n d u s t r i e s  vary  wide ly  w i t h  t h e  p l i g h t  of t h e  North American and 
European p roducers  b e i n g  t h e  most s e r i o u s .  I r o n i c a l l y ,  i f  a n  assessment  of  
world s t e e l  p r o s p e c t s  had been c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  t h e  mid-1950s, i t  might w e l l  
have noted s e v e r a l  conv inc ing  r e a s o n s  f o r  s t e e l m a k e r s  i n  both  t h e s e  r e g i o n s  t o  
look forward t o  a  long,  i f  n o t  i n d e f i n i t e ,  p e r i o d  of pre-eminence. The North 
American i n d u s t r y  had been untouched by t h e  war and could  e a s i l y  e n l a r g e  on 
Table 1 World steel product ion ,  1950-1982 
Year 
------------------------ Shares  i n  world t o t a l  (percentage)  ----------------- 
North European Other Eas te rn  Other 
America ~omrnuni t~f i /  Western Europe Japan Europe c o u n t r i e s  
World t o t a l  
(thousand me t r i c  .tons) 
a /  F igures  f o r  1981-83 exclude I r e l and .  
- 
Source: Product ion d a t a  f o r  1950, 1960 and 1970 from ECE (1976:19, annexy. Data f o r  1981-83 from I I S I  (1984:3). 
Ii $ 5 ,  o e 4 u u u m u m a b m a m h l  rl 
I U O  
I O r )  
I 
e x i s t i n g  c a p a c i t y  i n  o r d e r  t o  m a i n t a i n  i t s  p o s i t i o n  of world l e a d e r s h i p .  
Al though much of  t h e  E u r o p e a n . c a p a c i t y  had been demolished by 1945, t h e  
i n d u s t r y  was r e b u i l d i n g  a t  a  r a p i d  pace and would no t  be encumbered by 
o b s o l e t e ,  pre-war c a p a c i t i e s  and t e c h n o l o g i e s .  More i m p o r t a n t ,  bo th  r e g i o n s  
had a  l o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d  t r a d i t i o n  i n  s t e e l  and could  be a s s u r e d  t h a t  t h e i r  
r e g i o n a l  marke t s  would c o n t i n u e  t o  accoun t  f o r  t h e  bulk  of world demand. 
D e s p i t e  t h e s e  a d v a n t a g e s ,  many American and European f i r m s  found themselves  i n  
a  p r e c a r i o u s  s i t u a t i o n  by t h e  mid 1970s. The f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  looks  a t  some 
o f  t h e  domest ic  o r  i n t e r n a l  f a c t o r s  which have c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h i s  r e v e r s a l .  
2.  INTEGRATED STEEL MAKING I N  A NEW ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 C o n t r a c t i n g  Demand and Expanding Capac i ty  
The c o m p i l a t i o n  of i n t e r - i n d u s t r y  d a t a  n e c e s s a r y  t o  document t h e  changing 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between s t e e l  and i t s  u s e r  i n d u s t r i e s  would be a  major 
u n d e r t a k i n g  which i s  beyond t h e  scope  o f  t h i s  paper .  However, i n d i r e c t  
e v i d e n c e  i s  a v a i l a b l e  which p r o v i d e s  s t r o n g  ev idence  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  f a l l  
i n  demand f o r  s t e e l  was, sometimes,  a  p r e c i p i t o u s  one.  Tab le  3 shows t r e n d s  
i n  p r o d u c t i o n  and consumption f o r  t h i r t e e n  major i r o n  and s t e e l  commodities 
and i n  t h r e e  major  s t e e l - p r o d u c i n g  r e g i o n s .  The p r o d u c t i o n  d a t a ,  a l t h o u g h  not  
d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  d i s c u s s i o n ,  conf i rm t h e  importance  of  t h e s e  
major  p roducers  f o r  t h e  world s t e e l  i n d u s t r y .  P roduc t ion  i n  EEC, where t h e  
c o n t r a c t i v e  e f f e c t s  of demand were most e v i d e n t ,  was between one e i g h t h  and 
one q u a r t e r  of  world t o t a l  f o r  t h e  commodities shown i n  t a b l e  3 .  T o g e t h e r ,  
t h e  t h r e e  r e g i o n s  s u p p l i e d  a s  much a s  one h a l f  of  world p r o d u c t i o n  o f  many o f  
t h e s e  s t e e l  commodities and i n v a r i a b l y  accounted f o r  more than  one q u a r t e r  of  
t h e  t o t a l .  
Data f o r  ' a p p a r e n t  ' c o n s u m p t i o n , 8 ~  d e f i n e d  t o  be domest ic  p roduc t  i o n  
p l u s  imports  l e s s  e x p o r t s ,  a r e  more r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  d i s c u s s i o n .  A 
f a l l  i n  l e v e l s  o f  consumption can  be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  c l e a r  i n d i c a t i o n  of  a  
c o n t r a c t i o n  of  demand owing t o  a  weakening of  s t e e l ' s  l i n k a g e s  w i t h  i t s  u s e r  
i n d u s t r i e s  a n d / o r  a  s h i f t  i n  f i n a l  demand away from s t e e l - i n t e n s i v e  
a c t i v i t i e s .  L e v e l s  of  consumption d e c l i n e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n  many i n s t a n c e s .  
C o n t r a c t i o n s  were most pronounced i n  t h e  EEC and f o r  commodities a t  t h e  
e a r l i e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  f a b r i c a t i o n  c h a i n  -- p i g  i r o n ,  w i r e  r o d s ,  a n g l e s ,  shapes  
and s e c t i o n s .  Fur the rmore ,  f o r  t h o s e  commodities where l e v e l s  o f  consumption 
d i d  i n c r e a s e ,  t h e  r i s e  was o f t e n  m a r g i n a l  and was by no means comparable w i t h  
t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  growth o f  income o r  t o t a l  manufac tu r ing  v a l u e  added i n  t h o s e  
c o u n t r i e s .  Even J a p a n ,  which i s  t o u t e d  t o  have t h e  w o r l d ' s  most e f f i c i e n t  and 
dynamic s t e e l  i n d u s t r y ,  shows a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  consumption of s e v e r a l  major 
9  / i tems.-  
A c r u c i a l  f a c t o r  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  p l i g h t  o f  many American and 
European s t e e l  f i r m s  was t h e i r  misjudgement of  t h e s e  t r e n d s  a s  t h e y  began t o  
emerge i n  t h e  e a r l y  1970s.  Firms i n c o r r e c t l y  i n t e r p r e t e d  s i g n s  o f  
d e c e l e r a t i n g  demand a s  a n o t h e r  c y c l i c a l  a b e r r a t i o n  w i t h  no prolonged impact .  
Such a t t i t u d e s  were n o t  i m p l a u s i b l e  when p laced  i n  t h e  longer  t e rm c o n t e x t  o f  
t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  development.  The i n d u s t r y  was long accustomed t o  a  p a t t e r n  o f  
expanding demand and had c o n t i n u a l l y  i n c r e a s e d  o p t i m a l  p l a n t  s i z e  t o  t a k e  
advan tage  of t h i s  t r e n d .  The f i r s t  moves toward l a r g e r - s i z e d  u n i t s  began a s  
e a r l y  a s  1860 and,  by 1900, annua l  p l a n t  c a p a c i t y  i n  many i n t e g r a t e d  i r o n  and 
s t e e l  u n i t s  was 100,000-200,000 t o n n e s .  P l a n t  s i z e  was c o n t i n u a l l y  expanded; 
i n  1920, a  t y p i c a l  r o l l i n g  m i l l  had a n  annua l  c a p a c i t y  of 600,000 tonnes .  The 
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advent of huge open pit mines and the later shift from open hearth furnaces to 
oxygen conversion hastened the move to larger unit size throughout the entire 
production process. Later, the Japanese were building integrated units with 
capacities of 3-10 million tonnes. Even after the demand for steel began to 
fall, massive investment programmes, typified by the British Steel 
Corporation's expansion programme and the French Fos development on the 
Mediterranean coast rolled on. Surprisingly, the rate of growth in steel 
capacity actually accelerated in 1975-77 although world demand peaked in 1974. 
By the time the steel industry embarked on an 'involuntary' transition to 
maturity, it was predominantly composed of large, vertically integrated, firms 
producing a wide range of steel products. Significantly, the investment 
attitudes in the major firms was predominantly one of a "tons mentality'' -- 
keeping excess capacity to protect their market share at times of maximum 
steel demand. This approach was a reflection of the industry's long 
experience during better times. Decisions were shaped by previous trends and 
comparatively little attention was given to an assessment of existing 
circumstances in user industries or the likely determinants of future demand. 
The consequences are vividly illustrated by the case of British Steel 
Corporation where, in 1971, the government endorsed plans to expand productive 
capacity to almost 40 million tonnes by 1980. Ironically, 1980 began with a 
tripartite dispute between government, industry and labour regarding a 
production level of 15-16 million tonnes. The extent of the misjudgement was 
compounded by mid-1982, when actual capacity was only 14 million tonnes .g/ 
Essentially, many parts of the industry had lost contact with their buyers and 
were unable to accurately judge the consequences of steel's changing 
relationships with its users. 
The cumulative effects of these miscalculations will take some time to 
redress. Steel capacity in OECD countries is currently about 600 million tons 
while consumption in 1984, which now appears to be a year of strong recovery, 
will probably not reach 440 million tons.g/ The problem of overcapacity is 
acute in the EEC. Under pressure from the European Commission, steelmakers 
have agreed to reduce capacity by 26.7 million tons in 1985 which would mean 
that their total steel-making capabilities would be 142 million tons by the 
end of that year. But demand (European consumption plus net exports) is 
forecasted to be 109 million tons in that year, implying that the problem of 
excess capacity will persist in future years. Similar steps are being taken 
in the US where five per cent of capacity (i.e., 7 million tons) was shut in 
1983 and an equivalent amount is planned for closure in the next two years. 
Likewise, in Japan, the world's biggest steelmaker -- Nippon Steel -- hopes to 
reduce its capacity by fifteen per cent in the next two years.g/ But 
efforts to rationalize the industry have been slowed by the political problems 
they have raised everywhere, particularly in Western Europe and North America 
where reductions would be most substantial. These problems, in turn, have 
contributed to the strong protectionist measures, advocated by governments and 
industry strategists alike, as a means of delaying the necessary reductions in 
work forces and plant size .s/ 
2.2 Competition from New Sources: the Role of Mini-mills 
Even if an accurate assessment of future demand had been available to 
investors in the mid-1970s, many firms would not have been in a position to 
adjust the level and composition of output accordingly. Investment costs had 
risen dramatically as plant size increased and the relative increase in these 
e x p e n d i t u r e s  meant t h a t  f i r m s  were h e a v i l y  committed t o  t h e  chosen 
t e c h n o l o g i e s .  A f u r t h e r  c o m p l i c a t i o n  was t h a t  s t e e l  makers had o n l y  a  l i m i t e d  
a b i l i t y  t o  make a l t e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e i r  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s e s  once new c a p a c i t y  
was i n  p l a c e .  
The l a c k  of f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  a d j u s t i n g  t o  chang ing  c o s t  s t r u c t u r e s  and 
s h i f t s  i n  market  demand on t h e  p a r t  of i n t e g r a t e d  s t e e l  p roducers  c r e a t e d  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  new c o m p e t i t o r s  i n  a l l  t r a d i t i o n a l  s t e e l - p r o d u c i n g  c e n t r e s .  
For example, s m a l l ,  non- in tegra ted  m i n i - m i l l s ,  now appear  t o  have i r r e v e r s i b l y  
c a p t u r e d  c e r t a i n  segments of  t h e  major p r o d u c e r s '  home marke t s .  While t h e  
major p roducers  mine t h e i r  own o r e ,  t u r n  o u t  a  wide r a n g e  of  p r o d u c t s  and want 
t o  remain v e r t i c a l l y  i n t e g r a t e d ,  m i n i - m i l l s  m e l t  s c r a p  t o  make s t e e l ,  buy i n  
s u p p l i e s  and a r e  seldom un ion ized .  These p r a c t i c e s  accord  m i n i - m i l l s  
s i g n i f i c a n t  c o s t  advan tages  over  t h e i r  l a r g e r  c o m p e t i t o r s ,  b u t  t h e y  a l s o  have 
much more i n t i m a t e  c o n t a c t s  wi th  s t e e l  u s e r s .  Most began by f o c u s i n g  on 
narrow geograph ic  market  a r e a s  where t h e y  e s t a b l i s h e d  c l o s e  working r e l a t i o n s  
wi th  t h e i r  buyers .  Even t h o s e  which have now e n l a r g e d  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  market  
they s e r v e  c o n t i n u e  t o  be h i g h l y  s p e c i a l i z e d  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t s  t h e y  s e l l  -- 
i n c l u d i n g  seamless  p i p e ,  s t e e l  r o o f i n g  and w i r e  r o d .  Th i s  e n a b l e s  them t o  
b e t t e r  adap t  t h e  p roduc t  t o  t h e  u s e r ' s  needs  and t o  d e v o t e  a  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  
p o r t i o n  of  t h e i r  funds  t o  R and D. Mini-mil ls  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  accoun ted  f o r  
o n l y  a  s m a l l  p o r t i o n  of  t h e  domest ic  market  -- 3 t o  5  p e r  c e n t  of  t h e  US 
market  i n  t h e  1960s. P r i m a r i l y  due t o  t h e i r  c o s t  advan tages  and i n t i m a t e  
c o n t a c t s  wi th  b u y e r s ,  t h e  market  s h a r e  o f  American min i -mi l l s  h a s  soa red  i n  
r e c e n t  y e a r s  and amounted t o  18 p e r  c e n t  i n  1983 .c/ 
The s u c c e s s f u l  development o f  m i n i - m i l l s  h a s  eroded a  major b a r r i e r  t o  
e n t r y  wi th  t h e  s t e e l  i n d u s t r y ,  t h e  h i g h  c o s t  of i n i t i a l  inves tment .  A s i m i l a r  
t h r e a t  t o  i n t e g r a t e d  s t e e l  makers i s  posed by new p r o d u c t i o n  t e c h n o l o g i e s  
which, a s  y e t ,  a r e  on ly  i n  t h e  deve lopmenta l  phase .  I f  p e r f e c t e d ,  new 
produc t ion  p r o c e s s e s  promise  t o  r e d u c e  c o s t s  and o p t i m a l  p l a n t  s i z e .  One 
example i s  ' t h i n  s l a b  c a s t i n g '  which i s  in tended  t o  c u t  t h e  s i z e  of  s t e e l  
c a s t e r s  and t h e  number of r o l l i n g  machines r e q u i r e d  t o  produce s h e e t .  
P r e v i o u s l y ,  inves tments  i n  t h e s e  machines c o s t  a s  much a s  $500 m i l l i o n  b u t  may 
soon f a l l  t o  a s  l i t t l e  a s  $10 mil l ion.%/  These i n n o v a t i o n s  w i l l  g r e a t l y  
r educe  t h e  c a p i t a l  c o s t s  t h a t  have h e l p e d  t o  r e s t r i c t  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  s t e e l  
i n d u s t r y .  
3 .  INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY 
3 .1  Links  wi th  Fore ign  Markets  
Long term s h i f t s  i n  p a t t e r n s  of  domes t i c  demand a f f e c t e d  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  and 
composi t ion of  world t r a d e .  I n  1950,  s t e e l  e x p o r t s  were l e s s  t h a n  11 p e r  c e n t  
o f  world p r o d u c t i o n .  However, t h i s  s h a r e  r o s e  s t e a d i l y  and ,  by 1982, exceeded 
25 per  c e n t  of world s t e e l  The growing v a r i e t y  of  p r o d u c t s  
demanded by s t e e l  u s e r s  encouraged f i r m s  t o  expand t h e i r  p roduc t  r a n g e s ,  a  
p r a c t i c e  t h a t  boosted t r a d e  between s t e e l - p r o d u c i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  Another 
s i g n i f i c a n t  t r a d e  s t i m u l a n t  was t h e  emergence o f  e x c e s s  c a p a c i t y  i n  s e v e r a l  
developed c o u n t r i e s ;  a f t e r  t h e  slump a f t e r  1974,  many l a r g e  s t e e l  p r o d u c e r s  
began t o  look t o  f o r e i g n  buyers  a s  a  way t o  a l l e v i a t e  t h e i r  problems. 
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  demand f o r  s t e e l  i n  t h e  LDCs h a s  s t e a d i l y  r i s e n  and ,  coupled w i t h  
a  long-term d e c l i n e  i n  t r a n s p o r t  c o s t s ,  h a s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  growth i n  world  
s t e e l  t r a d e .  Thus ,  a  l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  of t h e  s t e e l  p r o d u c e r ' s  buyers  were f a r  
removed from t h e  p roducer .  While t h i s  i s  a  s i t u a t i o n  common t o  most modern 
i n d u s t r i e s ,  i t  was new f o r  many of t h e  t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d  s t e e l  f i r m s .  
G r a d u a l l y ,  e x p o r t i n g  came t o  p lay  a  more i m p o r t a n t  r o l e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  
t h e  European i n d u s t r y  where e x c e s s  c a p a c i t y  was most s e r i o u s .  The 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  of s t e e l  e x p o r t s  i s  sugges ted  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  i n  1976,  s t e e l  
consumption i n  t h e  w o r l d ' s  major  marke t s  was 49 m i l l i o n  t o n s  below t h e  1973 
l e v e l  and i n  1979 i t  was s t i l l  34 m i l l i o n  t o n s  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  f i g u r e .  
But because  p r o d u c e r s  had i n c r e a s e d  b o t h  t h e i r  d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  e x p o r t s  of  
s t e e l ,  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  d e c l i n e s  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  were n o t  s o  g r e a t .  R e l a t i v e  
t o  1973, t h e  d r o p  i n  reduction was 34 m i l l i o n  t o n s  i n  1976 and on ly  28 
f 7  / m i l l i o n  t o n s  i n  1979.- 
T a b l e  4  documents t h i s  t r e n d ,  showing a  s t e a d y  i n c r e a s e  i n  n e t  e x p o r t s  a s  
a  s h a r e  of  p r o d u c t i o n .  By t h e  end of  t h e  1970s ,  t o t a l  e x p o r t s  of s t e e l  ( b o t h  
d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t )  accoun ted  f o r  18.8 p e r  c e n t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  major  
s t e e l  p roduc ing  c o u n t r i e s .  Although more r e c e n t  f i g u r e s  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i t h  
r e g a r d  t o  n e t  i n d i r e c t  e x p o r t s )  a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e  upward t r e n d  a p p e a r s  t o  
have c o n t i n u e d  i n  t h e  1980s .  With r e g a r d  t o  d i r e c t  s t e e l  e x p o r t s ,  t a b l e  5  
shows changes  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  l e v e l s  and e x p o r t  s h a r e s  f o r  t h r e e  major 
c a t e g o r i e s  of  s t e e l  p r o d u c t s .  A f a l l  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of  b a s i c  s t e e l  i t e m s  
( r o d s ,  a n g l e s ,  s h a p e s  and s e c t i o n s )  o c c u r r e d  i n  s e v e r a l  c o u n t r i e s .  However, 
t r a d e  i n  t h e s e  i t e m s  -- both  impor t s  and e x p o r t s  -- expanded s t e a d i l y  a n d ,  i n  
f a c t ,  by 1981 e x p o r t s  accoun ted  f o r  15 pe r  c e n t  of  p r o d u c t i o n  among t h e  
c o u n t r i e s  shown. The growing importance  of  t r a d e  i n  s t e e l  p r o d u c t s  i s  e q u a l l y  
obvious  f o r  t h e  two o t h e r  major c a t e g o r i e s  shown i n  t a b l e  5.  
The r o l e  bf t r a d e  i n  s t e e l  p r o d u c t s  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  
e x t e n t  t o  which t r a d e  b a r r i e r s  have l i m i t e d  e x p o r t s .  As p r o t e c t i o n i s t  
r e s t r a i n t s  on t r a d e  i n  s t e e l  p r o d u c t s  have  p r o l i f e r a t e d ,  p o l i c y  makers and 
s t r a t e g i s t s  i n  a  few c o u n t r i e s  -- J a p a n ,  South  Korea and Taiwan -- t u r n e d  
t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  i n d i r e c t  e x p o r t s  ( i  . e . ,  s h i p s ,  v e h i c l e s  and machine 
t o o l s ) .  The f i g u r e s  i n  t a b l e  6  show t h e  volume and compos i t ion  o f  i n d i r e c t  
s t e e l  e x p o r t s  o f  J a p a n ,  Western Europe and North America i n  v a r i o u s  y e a r s .  
C l e a r l y ,  i n d i r e c t  e x p o r t s  were of l i t t l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  North 
America; t h a t  r e g i o n  was a  n e t  i m p o r t e r  of s t e e l - u s i n g  p r o d u c t s  th roughout  t h e  
1970s. Although t h e  volume of  i n d i r e c t  s t e e l  e x p o r t s  from Europe was 
approx imate ly  two and a  h a l f  t imes  t h a t  o f  Japan  i n  1979,  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  
i n d i r e c t  impor t s  were n e g l i g i b l e .  Measured i n  n e t  t e r m s ,  J a p a n ' s  i n d i r e c t  
e x p o r t s  grew r a p i d l y  and were comparable t o  European l e v e l s  by t h e  end of t h e  
1970s. 
The s u c c e s s f u l  development of  i n d i r e c t  e x p o r t s  o f  J a p a n e s e  s t e e l  had 
s e v e r a l  consequences  a s  sugges ted  by t h e  chang ing  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
p roduc t  groups .  I n  1962,  t h e  b u l k  of  J a p a n ' s  i n d i r e c t  s t e e l  e x p o r t s  were 
accounted f o r  by i n t e r m e d i a t e  s t e e l  p r o d u c t s ,  r o l l i n g  s t o c k ,  and 
n o n - e l e c t r i c a l  machinery .  Tha t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  had changed comple te ly  by 1979; 
more t h a n  50 p e r  c e n t  of  such t r a d e  was dependent  on e x p o r t s  o f  t h e  a u t o  
i n d u s t r y  ( p a s s e n g e r  c a r s ,  commercial  v e h i c l e s ,  and p a r t s ) .  The a u t o  i n d u s t r y  
accounted f o r  a  much s m a l l e r  s h a r e  of  i n d i r e c t  s t e e l  e x p o r t s  i n  Western  Europe 
and North America -- 36.6 p e r  c e n t  and 30.4 pe r  c e n t  r e s p e c t i v e l y  i n  1979. 
Table  4 .  Reduction and n e t  e x p o r t s  of major s t e e l  producing r e g i o n s  !I/ 
s e l e c t e d  y e a r s  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  of m e t r i c  t o n s  of  s t e e l  p roducts )  
Product ion  ( i n  m i l l i o n s  of m t r i c  
t o n s  of  s t e e l  p r o d u c t s )  173 224 287 33 7  303 325 
Yet e x p o r t s  o f  s tee1.b '  ( a s  
a  parcentaga  of  p r o d u c t i o n ) :  
Net d i r e c t  e x p o r t s  6.4 7 . 1  7 . 3  9.2  12.9 1 2 . 0  
Net i n d i r e c t  e x p o r t s  4 . 0  3.6 3 . 8  4 .2  6 .9  6 .8  
g/ F i g u r e s  i n c l u d e  t h e  product ion  and t r a d e  of Japan.  North America, t h e  E u r o p e u  
C-nity (exc luding  Greece) ,  A u s t r i a ,  Spain.  Sweden and Swi tzer land .  Trade 
between t h e  US and Canada is exc luded .  
b/ - Yet e x p o r t s  a r e  d e f i n e d  t o  be e x p o r t s  l e s s  impor t s .  Yet i n d i r e c t  e x p o r t s  r e f e r  
t o  t r a d e  i n  s t e e l - u s i n g  products  (e .8 .  cars . .  t o o l s ,  machinery).  
Source: IISI. (1982:2) 
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Table 6. The v o l u w  and composition of indirect steel exports 
by major producing regions ,5/ selected years 
Japan Western Europe North America 
1962 1970 1979 
- - -  
1962 1970 1979 
- - -  
1962 lplo 1979 
Trade in thousands 
of tons of finished 
steel equivalent 
Indirect 
exports 
Yet indirect 
exports b/ 980 4231 11698 5764 8679 12228 507 (-1207) (-1572) 
By product group 
(as a percentage of 
indirect exports) c/ 
1. Mon-electrical 
machinery 
2. Electrical 
uchinery and 
equiprent 
3. Agricultural 
uchinery and 
tractors 
4. Polling stock 
5. Passenger cars 
6. C-ercial 
vehicles 
7. Motor-vehicle 
parts 
8. Domestic 
appliances and 
equiprent 
9. Interrediate 
steel products 
10.0ther 
unufactureres 
a/ Country coverage is the sras as shown in table 1. 
- 
b/ Indirect exports less indirect imports. 
- 
c/ Percentages u y  not add to 100 due to rounding. 
- 
Source: IJNIDO (1983:284). 
A successful tactic of expanding indirect exports of steel depends on 
close collaboration between the steel-using exporters and steelmakers 
themselves. Self-discipline is required of the latter group since an increase 
in steel exports could jeopardise the strategy. In general, a comparison of 
the regional figures for indirect exports, net indirect exports, and the 
industry composition of trade, all point to the fact that Japanese steel 
suppliers have been more effective in maintaining a much closer relationship 
with their domestic users than have European or North American producers. 
They have also benefitted considerably from the successful export programmes 
established by those industries. 
At first glance it is tempting to attribute this result to the simple fact 
that Japanese automakers were far more efficient than their international 
competitors and the respective suppliers, i.e., the steel producers in each 
country, benefitted or suffered accordingly. Although that point is certainly 
valid, the actual causes are more complex and involve the attitudes of the 
steel suppliers as well as the competitive abilities of the respective 
automakers. Conditions in the US market are indicative of some of these 
problems. Until very recently, steel buying by US automakers had been an 
automatic process conducted with the reassurance of a familiar ritual. At the 
beginning of each year a supplier would be awarded a fixed percentage of the 
auto firm's needs for particular steels at particular plants. Automakers who 
wanted steel made to certain specifications was usually told that they would 
have to accept the tolerances of the American Iron and Steel Institute. 
Similarly, the auto industry was not interested to here from a steel maker who 
thought he,had a better or cheaper way of doing things. As one analyst 
described the situation, "The steel companies' attitude was, 'We make steel. 
If you want it, buy it'. Conversely, the automakers' approach to suppliers 
was, 'You make the steel. Don't tell us how to make a carw'.18/ 
3.2 The International Migration of Steel-using Activities 
Although trade has gradually assumed a greater importance in the steel 
industry, integrated producers have long been conspicuous for their reluctance 
to establish production sites in foreign markets. One reason for the 
xenophobic attitude is that steelmaking was traditionally geared to meet 
domestic needs. Firms have yet to develop an international orientation that 
would be compatible with their new-found need to export. Another is that only 
a few steel firms -- mainly Japanese -- presently have the financial 
capability to pursue this alternative. And those that do have the necessary 
finances are hesitant to acquire existing facilities abroad owing to the 
antiquity of American and European steelworks. 
In contrast, the automobile industry which is the major user of steel, has 
a long tradition of internationalization. It is, perhaps, a curious fact that 
soon after the first auto firms were established, they became multinational. 
By 1914, Ford had plants in Canada, France and the UK and on1 15 years later 
that firm was assembling cars in no fewer than 20 countries.- 14/ ,enera1 
Motors followed suit and by 1928 was operating 19 plants in 15 countries. 
During the 1970s, the direction of migration in the automobile industry was 
away from established markets in the US, Canada, and the EEC to Spain, South 
Korea, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and other parts of South 
America. Smaller auto plants were also established in unlikely countries such 
as Indonesia, Morocco, Thailand, and ~unisia.g/ 
By the 1970s the consequences of this migration for domestically-based 
suppliers of steel in the major auto-producing markets was alarming. As the 
auto firms relocated, their steel contacts moved with them. Interestingly, 
the steel industry has not adjusted its own strategies to reflect its maturity 
in the same manner as other industries. In the case of bulk chemicals, for 
example, the intention to specialize in products of higher value added 
required firms to be more aware of significant market developments. 
Similarly, the increasing need to provide specific products for specific users 
-- a typical characteristic of many maturing industries -- entailed a greater 
emphasis on marketing aspects. Such trends meant that auto makers, chemical 
producers, and firms in other maturing industries became more intimately 
concerned with conditions in foreign markets. And as this 'service 
orientation' emerged, relocation to the consuming market was often a result. 
There are some reasons to expect that the impact of migration by 
steel-using industries is lessening as new trade barriers (e.g., voluntary 
export restraints, and local content regulations) force the steel-using 
industries to locate production within the major consuming markets. Examples 
are the Toyota-General Motors agreement to start joint production in Fremont, 
California, the US-based production facilities of Honda and Nissan, Toyo 
Kogyo's (Mazda) links with Ford in Mexico, and Nissan's joint venture with 
Volkswagen. Significantly, Japanese steel producers have also begun to 
exhibit an interest in locating in the US market which parallels, to some 
extent, the Japanese-American linkages in the auto industry. The purchase by 
Nisshin of a modest stake in the US steel industry and the announced intention 
of Nippon Kokan (Japan's second largest steel producer) to acquire 50 per cent 
of another US firm attest to this new-found interest.=/ The major 
beneficiaries of this reversal will not necessarily be the original steel 
firms in the host country and the pressure on these firms to contract or exit 
from the industry will continue. 
4. EPILOGUE 
This paper makes no claim to have provided a complete picture of the 
determinants of the steel industry's relationships with its users. Obviously, 
any number of circumstances relating to factor markets, technological change, 
national policies and market structure can all have a bearing on these 
relationships. While each set of determinants would be important in their own 
right, they are typically considered in isolation and the cumulative effect on 
the industry's domestic and international position is thus obscured. 
Moreover, like several other ageing industries, the current steel crisis is 
partly attributable to circumstances which do not readily fit into the usual 
theoretical 'compartments' for analysis. The complacent or perfunctory 
attitudes which steel makers adopted towards their buyers provide an example 
of a non-economic phenomenon which contributed to the industry's problems. 
Another is the important role played by pressure groups within the steel 
industry in influencing government policy and industry strategies .??I In 
general, the range and complexity of determinants which will influence an 
industry's 'economic health' probably widens as an industry develops. 
Ironically, however, the scope of industry analysis may narrow as the industry 
matures. To some extent this is understandable as analysts working within an 
industry are often obliged to focus on selected issues such as import 
penetration, financial capabilities, or the extent of foreign subsidies which 
have political or policy connotations. But for analysts and economists who 
may enjoy the benefit of a perspective which is more remote from the 
industry's immediate problems, the usefulness of a more systematic evaluation 
of an industry in the broadest possible terms, including those sketched here, 
could be a rewarding and useful exercise. 
APPENDIX: ESTIMATES OF APPARENT CONSUMPTION OF STEEL PRODUCTS 
E s t i m a t e s  o f  a p p a r e n t  consumption were made a t  t h e  most d e t a i l e d  l e v e l  o f  
commodity s p e c i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  was p o s s i b l e .  Uni ted  Na t ions  s t a t i s t i c s  were t h e  
pr imary s o u r c e s  of  d a t a .  The f i r s t  s t e p  i n  t h e  e s t i m a t e  o f  a p p a r e n t  
consumption ( d e f i n e d  t o  be p r o d u c t i o n  p l u s  impor t s  l e s s  e x p o r t s )  r e q u i r e d  t h e  
a d o ~ t i o n  of  a  concordance between ISIC and SITC r e v .  1. P r o d u c t i o n  d a t a  a r e  
r e p o r t e d  i n  Yearbook of  I n d u s t r i a l  S t a t i s t i c s ,  v o l .  I1 a t  a  6 - d i g i t  l e v e l  o f  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  ISIC. Although t h e  l e v e l  o f  d i s a g g r e g a t i o n  exceeds  t h e  
formal  scope of  t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  a  b a s i s  f o r  an ad hoc concordance 
between t h e  ISIC and SITC, r e v .  1 i s  prov ided  i n  t h e  same p u b l i c a t i o n .  
While t h e  u s e  of d e t a i l e d  p r o d u c t i o n  d a t a  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  t a s k  of  matching 
e q u i v a l e n t  i t ems  i n  t h e  two c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  schemes,  s e v e r a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
remained.  Even a t  t h i s  l e v e l  o f  d i s a g g r e g a t i o n  a  s imple  one-to-one matchup 
between t h e  ISIC and SITC, r e v .  1 cou ld  n o t  be made f o r  a  number o f  t h e  
commodities.  I n  some i n s t a n c e s ,  d a t a  f o r  two o r  more SITC i t ems  were needed 
i n  o r d e r  t o  concord w i t h  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  6 - d i g i t  ISIC. I n  o t h e r  c a s e s ,  i t  was 
n e c e s s a r y  t o  combine two o r  more ISIC i t ems  i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  
t h a t  was c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  t r a d e  d a t a .  And f o r  a  few commodities,  
m u l t i p l e  combina t ions  of  bo th  SITC and ISIC d e s i g n a t i o n s  were r e q u i r e d .  I n  
each of  t h e s e  i n s t a n c e s  t h e  concordance p rov ided  i n  t h e  Yearbook o f  I n d u s t r i a l  
S t a t i s t i c s ,  v o l .  I1 was a g a i n  h e l p f u l  a s  i t  i n d i c a t e d  when e i t h e r  t h e  ISIC o r  
SITC d e s i g n a t i o n  was a  sub-component o f  t h e  o t h e r .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  match-up of  t h e  two s t a t i s t i c a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  cou ld  n o t  a lways  
be  o b t a i n e d  and t h e  r e l e v a n t  commodities were excluded from t h e  s t u d y .  T a b l e  
A - I  shows t h e  r e s u l t a n t  concordance used i n  t h i s  paper .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  a n  a c c u r a t e  and complete  p i c t u r e  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r e n d s  i n  s t e e l  consumpt ion,  i t  i s  impor tan t  t h a t  t h e  d a t a  i n c l u d e  t h o s e  c a s e s  
where no domes t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  o c c u r s  and consumption needs  a r e  met e n t i r e l y  
through impor t s .  A v a i l a b l e  p r o d u c t i o n  s t a t i s t i c s ,  however, do n o t  always 
d i s t i n g u i s h  between t h o s e  i n s t a n c e s  where p r o d u c t i o n  e i t h e r  i s  z e r o  o r  
n e g l i g i b l e  and t h o s e  where p r o d u c t i o n  h a s  o c c u r r e d  b u t  i s  n o t  reported.??/ 
T a b l e  A-I  P r o d u c t i o n - t r a d e  concordance f o r  a p p a r e n t  consumption d a t a  
used i n  t h i s  s t u d y  
Commod i t v  ISIC SITC, Rev. 1 
1. P i g  i r o n :  671.2 
from f o u n d r i e s  37 1007 
from s t e e l m a k i n g  371010 
2 .  Angles ,  shapes  
and s e c t i o n s  371035 673.4+673.5 
3 .  Heavy p l a t e s  37 1040 674.1 
4 .  Medium p l a t e s  3  7  1043 674.2 
5.  Thin  p l a t e s  371046 + 
371049 + 674.3 
3  7  1052 
6 .  T i n p l a t e  37 1055 674.7 
7.  Railway t r a c k  
m a t e r i a l  371067 676.1+676.2 
8.  P l a i n  w i r e  371070 677 
9. Tubes ,  seamless  371076 678.2 
10. Tubes,  welded 37 1079 678.3 
11. Rough s t e e l  
c a s t i n g s  37 1085 679.2 
Both s e t s  of d a t a  r e f e r  t o  
l i g h t  and heavy s e c t i o n s .  
More t h a n  4.75 mm. 
Trade d a t a  e x c l u d e  s t r i p s .  
Trade d a t a  e x c l u d e  t i n - c o a t e d  
s t r i p s .  
Trade d a t a  i n c l u d e  c r o s s i n g  
p i e c e s .  
Trade d a t a  i n c l u d e  i t e m s  
made from purchased w i r e  r o d .  
Trade d a t a  i n c l u d e  t u b e s  
made from purchased  i r o n  o r  
s t e e l .  
12. S t e e l  f o r g i n g s  371088 679.3 
I f  bo th  t h e s e  s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  t r e a t e d  i n  t h e  same manner, t h e  r e s u l t  would be 
o c c a s i o n a l  u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n  of consumption l e v e l s  f o r  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  p r o v i d e  
d a t a  on impor t s  and produce t h e  commodity d o m e s t i c a l l y  b u t  do n o t  r e p o r t  t h e  
l a t t e r .  I n  o r d e r  t o  s a f e g u a r d  a g a i n s t  t h i s  r e s u l t ,  v a r i o u s  o t h e r  s t a t i s t i c a l  
s o u r c e s  and j o u r n a l s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  i n d u s t r y  were c o n s u l t e d .  
F o r t u n a t e l y ,  a  more e x t e n s i v e  s e a r c h  of  t h e  r e l e v a n t  d a t a  h a s  been c a r r i e d  
o u t  a s  p a r t  of a  wider  r a n g i n g  U N I D O  p r o j e c t . E /  Thus,  when p r o d u c t i o n  was 
assumed t o  be z e r o ,  a  f u r t h e r  check was a v a i l a b l e  through a  s e a r c h  of  t h e  
Uni ted  Na t ions  t r a d e  t a p e s .  As ide  from t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of r e - e x p o r t s  
j5ixP:rts of a  g iven  i tem should  be z e r o  i f  domes t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  does  n o t  occur.- 
s t r a i g h t  forward examina t ion  of  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  e x p o r t s  was n o t  though t  t o  be 
s u f f i c i e n t ,  however, s i n c e  non- repor t ing  may o c c u r  f o r  bo th  p r o d u c t i o n  and 
e x p o r t s .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  import  d a t a  of  a l l  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  
Uni ted  Na t ions  t r a d e  t a p e s  was sea rched  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  no p o t e n t i a l  t r a d i n g  
p a r t n e r s  r e p o r t e d  i m p o r t s  of  t h e  g i v e n  commodity from t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  q u e s t i o n .  
A s i m i l a r  problem a r o s e  i n  t h e  c o m p i l a t i o n  of  a s s o c i a t e d  t r a d e  d a t a .  
C o u n t r i e s  sometimes r e p o r t  o n l y  t h e  v a l u e  o f  import  o r  e x p o r t s  b u t  f a i l  t o  
f i g u r e s  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  cor respond ing  volume o f  t r a d e .  Where p o s s i b l e ,  
e s t i m a t e s  of  t h e  volume of  t r a d e  were made. The f i r s t  s t e p  i n  t h i s  e x e r c i s e  
was t o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  u n i t  v a l u e  o f  t h e  t o t a l  t r a d e  f low,  i . e . ,  t h e  p e r  u n i t  
v a l u e  of each c o u n t r y ' s  e x p o r t s  and i m p o r t s  f o r  each s t e e l  commodity and y e a r  
where d a t a  was a v a i l a b l e .  I n  t h o s e  i n s t a n c e s  where u n i t  v a l u e s  c o u l d  be 
o b t a i n e d  f o r  o t h e r  y e a r s  i n  e i t h e r  p e r i o d  (1972-1974 o r  1978-19801, a n  a v e r a g e  
f o r  a v a i l a b l e  y e a r s  was a p p l i e d .  These f i g u r e s  were t h e n  used  t o  e s t i m a t e  t h e  
volume of t r a d e  f o r  t h o s e  y e a r s  where o n l y  v a l u e s  were reported.?&/ 
E s t i m a t e s  of  t h e  volume o f  t r a d e  c o u l d  o f t e n  be made by u s i n g  such means. 
However, t h e r e  were a  number of  i n s t a n c e s  where t h e  c o u n t r y  p rov ided  no d a t a  
on t h e  volume o f  t r a d e  f o r  any yea r  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  p e r i o d .  Here ,  p a r t n e r  
c o u n t r y  d a t a  was used t o  c a l c u l a t e  a  u n i t  v a l u e  based upon f i g u r e s  r e p o r t e d  by 
t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s .  I n  each i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  u n i t  v a l u e  was d e r i v e d  from 
t r a d e  f o r  t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o u n t r y  and p r o d u c t  i n  q u e s t i o n .  Where no i n f o r m a t i o n  
was a v a i l a b l e  t o  e s t i m a t e  a  u n i t  v a l u e ,  r e l e v a n t  quantum d a t a  was sometimes 
a v a i l a b l e  i n  o t h e r  s o u r c e s .  I f  n o t ,  t h e s e  o b s e r v a t i o n s / c o u n t r i e s  
were excluded . 
A r e l a t e d  problem o c c u r r e d  when no t r a d e  was r e p o r t e d  ( n e i t h e r  v a l u e s ,  nor  
volume).  I n  o r d e r  t o  e s t i m a t e  a p p a r e n t  consumpt ion,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h  between i n s t a n c e s  of  n o n - r e p o r t i n g  and t h o s e  where no t r a d e  -- 
e x p o r t s ,  imports  o r  b o t h  -- a c t u a l l y  o c c u r r e d .  To s a f e g u a r d  a g a i n s t  t h e  
e r r o n e o u s  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  no t r a d e  took  p l a c e  (when, i n  f a c t ,  i t  d i d  b u t  was 
n o t  r e p o r t e d )  t h e  d a t a  of  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  one i n  q u e s t i o n  was 
examined t o  i d e n t i f y  ' t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s ' .  The f i r s t  s t e p  i n  t h i s  e x e r c i s e  was 
t o  s e a r c h  t h e  Uni ted  Na t ions  t r a d e  t a p e s  o f  t h e  ' r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d '  i n  o r d e r  
t o  i d e n t i f y  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s  i n  every  i n s t a n c e  where a  c o u n t r y ' s  e x p o r t s  o r  
impor t s  of  a  p a r t i c u l a r  commodity were n o t  r e p o r t e d  o r  were shown t o  be  
' z e r o ' .  Where e v i d e n c e  of  t r a d e  was n o t e d ,  t h e  d a t a  r e p o r t e d  by p a r t n e r  
c o u n t r i e s  was summed i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  a n  e s t i m a t e  of  t h e  volume of  
non-repor ted  t r a d e .  Thus ,  t h e  impor t s  ( e x p o r t s )  o f  t h e  world  from ( t o )  
c o u n t r y  X were r e g a r d e d  a s  c o u n t r y  X ' s  e x p o r t s  ( i m p o r t s )  t o  t h e  w o r l d . Z /  
The same convers ion  p rocedures  a n d / o r  methods of  e s t i m a t i n g  u n i t  v a l u e s ,  a s  
d e s c r i b e d  above,  were sometimes r e q u i r e d .  
NOTES 
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R .  B a l l a n c e  and S. S i n c l a i r ,  C o l l a p s e  and S u r v i v a l :  I n d u s t r y  S t r a t e g i e s  i n  
a Changing World, A l l e n  and Unwin, London, 1983,  p. 94.  
Bus iness  Week, 20 August 1984,  p. 87 .  
S tee lmakers  have a l s o  reduced t h e i r  own usage  of  c r u d e  s t e e l  p e r  u n i t  o f  
f i n i s h e d  s t e e l  th rough  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  advances  and improvements i n  r o l l i n g  
and f i n i s h i n g  b u t  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  o f  t h e s e  advances  a r e  l e s s  impor tan t  t h a n  
t h o s e  s t r e s s e d  h e r e .  
See The Economist ,  14 J u l y  1984. 
ECE, 1976, p.8. 
I I S I ,  World S t e e l  i n  F i g u r e s ,  B r u s s e l s ,  1984,  p. 3 .  
Consumption i s  d e s c r i b e d  a s  ' a p p a r e n t '  s i n c e  t h e  measure does  n o t  t a k e  
account  of  changes  i n  i n v e n t o r i e s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  smooth o u t  i n v e n t o r y  
e f f e c t s ,  th ree -year  a v e r a g e s  have been c a l c u l a t e d .  
Apparent  consumption i n  Japan  f e l l  between 1972-74 and 1979-81 f o r  f i v e  
commodities and r o s e  i n  f o u r  o t h e r  i t ems .  Comparable d a t a  f o r  bo th  t ime  
p e r i o d s  was n o t  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  f o u r  o t h e r  commodities.  
The Times, 8 June 1982. 
F i n a n c i a l  Times, 5 November 1984. 
The Economist ,  14 J u l y  1984. 
For a u s e f u l  d i s c u s s i o n  of  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  e f f o r t s  i n  t h e  s t e e l  i n d u s t r y ,  
s e e  K.  J o n e s ,  Impasse and C r i s i s  i n  S t e e l  Trade  P o l i c y ,  Trade  P o l i c y  
Research C e n t r e ,  London, 1983. 
14. Bus iness  Week, 13 J u n e ,  1983. 
15. Business  Week, 24 September 1984. 
16.  B a l l a n c e  and S i n c l a i r ,  p. 106 and I I S I ,  1984,  p. 13. 
17. Based on Committee on Economic S t u d i e s ,  I n d i r e c t  Trade  i n  S t e e l  - 1962 t o  
1979, I I S I ,  B r u s s e l s ,  1982,  p.1. Major s t e e l  consuming marke t s  a r e  
d e f i n e d  a s  i n  t a b l e  1. 
18. F o r t u n e ,  16 May, 1983.  
19. Maxcy, 1981,  p. 69. 
20. Although many o f  t h e s e  r e l o c a t i o n s  invo lved  o n l y  assembly o p e r a t i o n s  t h e  
n e t  e f f e c t s  of t h e  move away from t r a d i t i o n a l  c e n t r e s  of  p r o d u c t i o n  was 
s i g n i f i c a n t .  
21. I f  concluded,  t h e  l a t t e r  a c q u i s i t i o n  would be  t h e  l a r g e s t  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  
inves tment  e v e r  i n  t h e  US s t e e l  i n d u s t r y .  F i n a n c i a l  Times,  1 May 1984. 
22.  R. B a l l a n c e  and S. S i n c l a i r ,  ' R e - i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g  America; P o l i c y  Makers 
and I n t e r e s t  Groups ' ,  The World Economy, v o l .  7 ,  no.  2 ,  June  1984, pp.  
197-2 14. 
23. I n  t h e  pr imary s o u r c e  of  p r o d u c t i o n  d a t a ,  Yearbook o f  I n d u s t r i a l  
S t a t i s t i c s ,  v o l .  11, i n s t a n c e s  where z e r o  o r  n e g l i g i b l e  p r o d u c t i o n  
o c c u r r e d  a r e  no ted  i f  some p r o d u c t i o n  a c t u a l l y  o c c u r r e d  and was r e p o r t e d  
f o r  a t  l e a s t  one y e a r  d u r i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  p e r i o d  covered .  
24.  The r e s u l t s  of t h i s  wider  r a n g i n g  s t a t i s t i c a l  p r o j e c t  a r e  r e p o r t e d  i n  
U N I D O ,  1985. 
25. Imports  of  t h e  commodity from a  s p e c i f i c  c o u n t r y  ( c o u n t r y  X) does  n o t  
e n s u r e  t h a t  domes t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  of  t h e  commodity a c t u a l l y  o c c u r r e d  i n  
c o u n t r y  X .  T h i s  t r a d e  c o u l d  have  been r e - e x p o r t s  from c o u n t r y  X. 
However, t h e r e  was no means t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between t h o s e  i n s t a n c e s  where 
t h e  impor t s  were n a t i o n a l  e x p o r t s  from c o u n t r y  X and t h o s e  where t h e y  were  
re -expor t s  from t h e  c o u n t r y .  Thus,  when a t  l e a s t  one t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r  
r e p o r t e d  i m p o r t s  from c o u n t r y  X ,  t h e  assumpt ion  of  z e r o  domes t i c  
p r o d u c t i o n  i n  c o u n t r y  X was r e j e c t e d .  
26. When u n i t  v a l u e s  c o u l d  be  c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  two of  t h e  t h r e e  y e a r s  i n  a  
p e r i o d ,  an  a v e r a g e  was t a k e n  when e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  volume of t r a d e  i n  t h e  
t h i r d  y e a r .  I f  a  u n i t  v a l u e  c o u l d  be c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  o n l y  one y e a r ,  t h i s  
f i g u r e  was employed t o  o b t a i n  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  volume of  t r a d e  i n  t h e  o t h e r  
two y e a r s .  F i g u r e s  f o r  one t ime  p e r i o d  were  n o t  used t o  e s t i m a t e  a  u n i t  
v a l u e  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  p e r i o d .  
27. I t  should  be no ted  t h a t  t h e  e s t i m a t e s  which were  d e r i v e d  u s i n g  t h i s  
p rocedure  r e f e r r e d  t o  g e n e r a l  t r a d e  s t a t i s t i c s ,  t h a t  i s ,  e x p o r t s  i n c l u d i n g  
re -expor t s  and i m p o r t s  i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  f o r  r e - e x p o r t s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  s p e c i a l  
t r a d e  s t a t i s t i c s  which would e x c l u d e  r e - e x p o r t s .  
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